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A B S T R A C T
The integration of variable generation challenges electricity systems globally. Using Ireland's electricity sector as
a case study, we highlight multiple challenges in reconciling ambition for variable renewable integration with
market economics and system operation. Ireland has the highest share of non-synchronous variable renewable
electricity on a single synchronous power system. This case study examines the strategy being implemented to
optimally balance between efficiency, flexibility and adequacy while maintaining a fully functional system that
strives to adapt to evolving conditions. The transition that the Single Electricity Market underwent to comply
with the EU Target Market was a major overhaul of what made the all-island market a success. Volume-based
reliability options have distinct advantages over capacity payments. System services are critical for system
stability and 14 separate system services are being developed. These actions, when taken together, provide an
insight into the lengths to which this electricity market must go to transform from its cost-based nature to a
value-based alternative that rewards flexible and reliable capacity with the ability to evolve with market con-
ditions of the future.
1. Introduction
In many parts of the world, the electricity sector is in the midst of
technological change. Generation portfolios today are different to those
of the past and will continually evolve into the future. Consequently,
electricity markets are also experiencing change, a change that partially
stems from the sectors’ failure to effectively internalise the external
costs associated with electricity generation in the past, regarding
emissions. While many modern-day societies have policies in place to
curtail the effects of climate change through the promotion of renew-
able energy and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, this was not
always the case.
In the electricity sector, these policies can often encourage zero-
marginal-cost generation (generally non-dispatchable1 and non-syn-
chronous2) through support mechanisms while discouraging fossil-fuel
based capacity (typically dispatchable and synchronous) with increased
marginal costs through carbon taxation; displacing the latter. When the
level of displacement escalates, it can create system stability challenges
for the system operators in terms of inertia, frequency and voltage re-
sponse requirements [1]. This can also create issues for market
participants who fail to recover sufficient revenue to service debts re-
lated to fixed costs associated with dispatchable capacity; capacity
which is considered important for long-term system generation ade-
quacy [2]. In short: this situation occurs when policy measures pro-
moting variable renewable generation push up against the limits of the
system to absorb the technical characteristics of this type of electricity
generation.
In this paper we use Ireland's wholesale electricity sector as a case
study to demonstrate the effects of the previously mentioned dis-
placement that results from climate mitigation policies, focusing on the
planned actions/strategy to maintain a fully functional, balanced
system which promotes flexibility from its market participants while
remaining cost efficient and within system adequacy limits. The Irish
system is an intriguing choice of case study due to its uniqueness in
European terms insofar as it is an isolated system with limited storage
or interconnection and yet, one of the highest levels of variable re-
newable generation in the region, thereby making it one of the most
challenging to operate within Europe. This paper maps out the ap-
proach taken by the Irish authorities to adapt their market and overall
system to the evolving conditions, attempting to remain ‘fit for purpose’
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in a time when many are not – a perspective shared by Refs. [3,4].
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the transfor-
mation Ireland's electricity market underwent to align its trading plat-
forms, ex-ante pricing structures, and other aspects to ensure compat-
ibility with the European integrated internal market for electricity and
comply with the European Union's Third Energy Package.3 Section 3
overviews the redesign of the capacity payment mechanism to address
concerns surrounding the lack of entry or exit signals, the potential for
over-compensation and the absence of a competitive edge that exist in
its current form. Section 4 describes how the current ancillary service
arrangements will be restructured to facilitate up to 75% system pe-
netration of variable renewable generation, creating one of the most
complex system service arrangements used in the electricity sector
worldwide. Section 5 concludes the case study with some final remarks.
2. Transforming an energy market
Ireland transformed its electricity market to become compatible
with the greater European regional market and remain compliant with
the EU Third Energy Package. After receiving derogations on im-
plementing the EU Target Model (TM)4 due to its unique situation of
being an “island system with central dispatch” [7, Section 1.2], the all-
island electricity market became compatible with the regional day-
ahead market on 1st October 2018 [7,8]. It may also be suggested that
Ireland's electricity market needed to adapt to remain ‘fit for purpose’ as
conditions within the sector evolve, both naturally and as a consequent
of policy influence.
For instance, in additional to the EU Third Energy Package which
primarily focuses on the internal market for both electricity and gas, EU
climate mitigation policies focused on increasing renewable energy and
reducing both greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution limits, also
impact the electricity sector. Policies such as the 2020 Climate and
Energy Package for example, set binding targets for the EU to achieve
regarding the renewable energy share of gross final consumption, re-
ducing greenhouse gas emissions and improving energy efficiency.
Once transmitted into individual Member State targets via EU Directive
2009/28/EC [9], Ireland was assigned a 16% renewable share of gross
final consumption target for 2020. To reach the national target, in-
dividual sectoral targets were established for renewable electricity
(40%), renewable heat (12%) and renewable transport (10%). As a
result, it is estimated that 5.3 GW of wind power capacity must be in-
stalled [10], representing 33% of the anticipated total generation
portfolio for the entire island to achieve the renewable targets of both
jurisdictions.
2.1. The all-island electricity market
The all-island Single Electricity Market (SEM) was established in
2007 as the main trading platform for electricity on the island of
Ireland. The cross-jurisdictional, dual-currency market was built on a
centrally dispatched gross pool model that was the sole route to market
for generators and suppliers alike.5 The transition SEM underwent to
comply with the TM was a major overhaul of what made the all-island
market a success, both in terms of mitigating market power through full
transparency of data and also providing a market that “worked well for
consumers in Ireland” according to Gorecki [ [11], p.677].
However, gross pool markets are often used as an intermediary step
between a monopoly and a fully open bilateral market – akin to a fully
open, liberalised market on training wheels according to Harris [12]. In
the SEM, the ‘training wheels’ reference referred to the lack of risk
exposure for market participants which has wider effects on the system.
For example, SEM did not provide sufficient exit signals for old, in-
efficient capacity nor did it encourage the entry of units that added
value to the system through flexibility. In other words, SEM lacked a
competitive edge. This is an argument that reoccurs numerous times
throughout the paper when describing different aspects of the overall
market transformation.
From a high level, Ireland's electricity market did not need to
change from a pool-based design to bilateral contracts based alternative
to comply with the TM, instead it needed to develop the market fra-
mework in which it occupied to be more dynamic, i.e. relying less on
the ‘training wheels’ aspect of a pool market and introduce competition
for increased system efficiency. For this development to take place,
several issues needed to be addressed before any alignment could be
achieved. For example, system marginal prices in SEM were set (4 days)
ex-post rather than ex-ante, suppliers could not submit a demand curve,
and there was no continuous intra-day market or forward market li-
quidity of any significance. Coupled with the knowledge that SEM was
centrally dispatched as opposed to self-dispatched markets in the rest of
Europe (except Cyprus), the scale of the task is evident. As summarised
by Gorecki; “Aligning SEM with the Target Model appears very much to be a
matter of fitting a square peg into a round hole.” [ [11], p.687].
2.1.1. Market transformation
With guidance (and the previously mentioned derogations) pro-
vided by the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER),
the Regulatory Authorities (RAs)6 laid out plans for the transition to
become TM compliant. Through a number of decision papers, bilateral
meetings, workshops and various working groups, the RAs put a pro-
gramme in place to transition to the new electricity market for the is-
land of Ireland, known as Integrated Single Electricity Market (I-SEM)
[13]. The RAs made key decisions relating to market operations when
they announced the current transmission system operator (TSO)7 as the
Nominated Electricity Market Operator, a requirement under the ca-
pacity allocation and congestion management network code,8 and on
the issue of centrally-versus self-dispatched models when it was decided
there would be no change on the current stance. The decision to retain
3 European Union 2009 Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 13 July 2009, concerning common rules for the internal market in
electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC.
4 The EU Target Model for electricity emerged in 2009 from the Florence
Forum process as a blueprint with top-down and bottom-up guidance on the
future market design that was deemed necessary to facilitate the EU internal
market for electricity [5]. Fully aligned with the three energy packages (Dir.
1996/92/EC, Dir. 2003/54/EC, Dir. 2009/72/EC), the Target Model outlines
the necessary approach to complete market integration applying clear rules for
implementation (network codes), market coupling initiatives (multi-regional
coupling) as well as restructuring the necessary power exchanges and the ne-
cessary systems to operate the power markets (forward, day-ahead, intra-day,
balancing markets) [6]. The model also involved harmonising information
models, developing a central information platform, and actively adjusting the
TM for better performance.
5 There is a De Minimis threshold of 10 MW for generators. Units below this
level could arrange bilateral contracts with suppliers in what was a residue from
old support schemes for variable renewable energy sources.
6 The Commission for Energy Regulation in the Republic of Ireland and the
Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation in Northern Ireland.
7 EirGrid and the System Operator of Northern Ireland (SONI) are the TSOs in
the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland jurisdictions respectively.
8 The capacity allocation and congestion management network code has been
an important network code implemented to-date. The code promotes eco-
nomically-driven electricity flows on interconnectors which, as alluded to by
McInerney and Bunn [14], does not always occurred. By lowering technological
and institutional barriers around interconnectors, European electricity markets
could be coupled in a similar way to that in the Nordic region since 1990 [15].
The code was essential when one considers the main aim of the TM is to
maximise social welfare gain, i.e. maximise consumer and supplier surpluses
[16]. Employing the “copper plate” effect as alluded by Barroso [17], the TM is
based on the principle that electricity generated in one area can be consumed in
another without constraints, causing a price equilibrium.
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the centrally-dispatched model was taken as the RAs considered self-
scheduling inappropriate for SEM due to the ‘lumpiness’9 of the system
and therefore believed central dispatch to be a core requirement of the
all-island system [13].
One of the largest differences between where SEM was and where it
needed to be was the design of its trading platforms. Implementing a
liquid forward market, a day-ahead market with ex-ante pricing, con-
tinuously traded intra-day market and cross-border balancing market
was all new territory for the all-island market. Each different market
had to become acquiescent to supplier participation, along with the
centrally dispatched model to be retained under the new structure.
Furthermore, importing a trading platform structure compatible with
the TM was only part of the task, instilling market confidence that each
platform would operate ‘as per design’ was equally important for
market success. This was especially relevant when one considers that
certain platforms (i.e. forward and intra-day) may require levels of li-
quidity not experienced in SEM. For instance, the forward market in
SEM was not utilised to its full potential for hedging medium to long-
term fuel prices as witnessed in other markets around Europe. Similarly,
if one considers that all market participants (including non-dispatch-
able generators) must be balance responsible in I-SEM as outlined by the
Single Electricity Market Committee [18,19], then trading in the intra-
day time frame needed to occur continuously compared to SEM's twice
daily intra-day auctions – a function that helps all market participants
to reduce their risk exposure. Fig. 1 illustrates the market timelines in I-
SEM.
The retention of the centrally dispatched model in Ireland's new
electricity market also had a bearing on how market participants ap-
proach the newly designed market platform structure. For instance,
notwithstanding the fact that there will be a forward market available
for hedging medium-to long-term prices, this will be financial only. To
physically trade electricity, the ex-ante markets (day-ahead and intra-
day) and the balancing market are the exclusive routes to market in
their respective timeframes, therefore generators need to be success-
fully dispatched to meet any financial contractual obligations agreed in
the forward market. While this does not occur in other European
markets due to their ability to bilaterally trade contracts between
generators and suppliers, the small scale and yet complex nature of
Ireland's electricity market makes the approach important for miti-
gating against market power exertion from legacy firms, according to
the RAs10 [13]. This introduces an additional level of risk for vertically
integrated companies that may have hedged forward to reduce risk
exposure around commodity prices for their thermal units for example,
yet if their generation capacity does not get dispatched the company is
fully exposed to market prices from their supply-side.
For market participants, transforming the pool-based energy market
to become compatible with the TM provides greater financial risk ex-
posure, especially electricity producers. Gaffney et al. [22] allude to the
‘comfortable’ position in which market participants in SEM have ex-
perienced to-date in such a risk adverse market design. Through an
‘uplift’ adder on shadow prices, ‘make whole payment’ and capacity
payment mechanism, both short and long run costs are likely to be
recovered, which provides an attractive incentive for potential new
entrants investing in the sector. Under the new market structure, a
capacity payment mechanism will remain in place for a select number
of participants to recoup fixed costs11 while the other ‘safety nets’
disappear. Therefore, I-SEM will be more onerous and complex for
market participants as financial risk management comes into focus.
Hedging risk exposure through forward contracting along with im-
plementing bidding strategies will be taken to a higher level than cur-
rently being applied. In other words, for the first time since market
liberalisation in 2000 the electricity sector in Ireland will operate
without ‘training wheels,’ leaving market participants open to risk, as is
the case in a fully liberalised, dynamic, open energy market [23].
With this new, heightened level of risk exposure burdening market
participants, along with the anticipated increase in zero-marginal-cost
generation in Ireland to reach mandatory renewable energy targets,
revenues earned outside of the energy market, such as capacity pay-
ments and auxiliary revenues, become even more in focus and critical
for long-term economic survival. Table 1 outlines the main changes
addressed in this paper regarding the market transformation in the all-
island electricity system, the focus of the case study.
3. Redesigning a capacity mechanism
Questions surrounding the inclusion of capacity payment mechan-
isms in the energy sector have long since been a hotly-debated topic as
alluded to by Di Cosmo and Lynch [24]. From a European electricity
sector context, with future generation portfolios set to contain high
levels of zero-marginal-cost variable renewable energy to achieve na-
tional and supranational targets, concern surrounding the ‘missing
money’ problem and the overall structure of modern-day electricity
market design is becoming increasingly pronounced, see publications
by Refs. [3,25–33].12 Based on the merit-order approach and economic
dispatch of units, the effect of high levels of zero-marginal-cost sources
is shown to reduce system marginal prices. Consequently, lower prices
mean less inframarginal rent is received by generators and marginal
plants may fail to service debts related to fixed costs without some
additional support; resulting in the ‘missing money’ problem and pos-
sibly leading to future concerns over generation adequacy.
The European Commission [28] recently launched an investigation
into the area surrounding levels of financial support granted to elec-
tricity producers and consumers by the EU Member States to maintain
sufficient generation adequacy levels. The purpose of the inquiry was to
identify any unduly favourable capacity payments to providers that
may have an impact on competition in the internal market and to en-
sure guidelines on state aid for environmental protection and energy
2014–2020 are adhered to13 [28,29,37]. The interim report associated
with the investigation stated that “In principle, wholesale electricity
markets (the ‘energy-only’ market) should be able to provide the price signals
necessary to trigger the necessary investments provided wholesale prices
9 This refers to the ratio between the largest generating unit on a system and
system demand. In SEM, a large unit may represent up to 20% of dispatchable
generation [13].
10 Cambridge Economics Policy Associates [21] noted that there was “no
significant market power exercised” in Ireland. However, market power exertion
has taken place elsewhere. Details of the case against E.ON AG by the European
Commission for the strategic withdrawal of capacity in German electricity
market, see: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?
proc_code=1_39388.
11 Capacity payments in the I-SEM will be auctioned. Discussed further in
Section 3.
12 Keay [3] suggests that European electricity markets may be broken and
discusses how they must evolve to become fit for purpose again. Sen [25]
outlines the need for a ‘reform of electricity reform.’ Glachant and Ruester [26]
believe the future EU electricity market may derail greatly from the effects of a
large push to renewables, even leading to possible re-fragmentation without
some coordinated policy frameworks around renewable supports and capacity
mechanisms. Glachant and Ruester [26] also allude to the European Commis-
sion's ability to use its power for policing state aids to only approve capacity
mechanisms if the Member State devotes funds to improving its interconnection
with neighbouring states.
13 The capacity mechanism recently implemented in Britain was the first
capacity mechanism to pass EU State Aid guidelines outlined in the Guidelines
on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014–2020 (‘EEAG’) [34].
Since then France have received clearance to introduce a market-wide capacity
mechanism [35] while Germany have also been granted permission for a Net-
work Reserve in the southern part of the country to ensure security of electricity
supply [36].
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allow fixed costs to be recovered.” [ [28], p.9]. The report continues on to
show awareness of the practicality or even the relevance of the previous
statement in modern-day electricity markets where “… [Electricity
markets] are characterised by uncertainties as well as a number of market
and regulatory failures which affect wholesale market price signals.” [ [28],
p.9]. To combat these ‘regulatory and market failures’ along with the
associated generation adequacy concerns, capacity mechanisms have
increased in popularity across Europe with eleven EU Member States
either using or planning to use some form of capacity payment [28,38].
However, concerns must be raised surrounding this un-unified
market-by-market approach regarding capacity mechanisms which will
create cross-border trade distortions where coupled markets use dif-
ferent approaches, e.g. an ‘energy-only’ market coupled with an ‘en-
ergy-plus-capacity’ market, or different types of capacity markets cou-
pled. This concern is especially relevant to this case study as the GB
capacity mechanism was recently suspended due to the outcome of an
anti-competitiveness case taken by Tempus Energy.14 Analysis by Gore
[32] expands on this concern and quantifies, using empirical analysis,
the difference between energy-only market and energy-plus-capacity
markets. While the analysis finds that coupled markets work in prin-
ciple, it also highlights that distributional effects are evident on inter-
connection flows when different capacity markets are accounted for.
With the issue expected to magnify in the future as an increasing
number of markets implement capacity mechanisms, a more co-
ordinated approach throughout Europe may be necessary to help avoid
negative effects on the internal market as highlighted by Gaffney [4].
3.1. Early capacity payments in Ireland
In Ireland, the first capacity payment scheme was introduced in
2001 to ensure adequate levels of generation capacity was in place to
meet the growing demand for electricity resulting from large economic
growth during the period. The Capacity Margin Payment Scheme, as it
was known, supported open cycle gas turbine capacity in the Republic
of Ireland, demand reduction schemes offered by the supply arm of the
dominant firm and contracted capacity from a generation unit in
Northern Ireland [39]. In 2007, this was replaced by the Capacity
Payment Mechanism (CPM), which, like its predecessor, was introduced
to encourage new investment in the sector, thereby stimulating com-
petition and easing generation adequacy concerns. As the first ‘energy-
plus-capacity’ market in Ireland, the CPM was a ‘Capacity Pot’ type
mechanism set annually by the RAs using the Best New Entrant meth-
odology to calculate the revenue required to recoup capital costs (net of
anticipated inframarginal rent) for a hypothetical unit that represented
the lowest cost per megawatt of installed capacity. Over the period
2007–2016, the pot averaged €551 million per annum15 and broadly
speaking, was distributed monthly to all generators depending on their
availability for generation.
Described as a ‘market-wide price-based capacity payment me-
chanism’ by both the European Commission [28] and Agency for the
Cooperation of Energy Regulators [31], the CPM, along with all other
Fig. 1. I-SEM market frame timeline [20]. Trading
participants submit bids and offers in the day-ahead
market for a specific day between 11:00 D-19 (19
days before delivery) and 11:00 D-1 (1 day before
delivery). The market is cleared with schedules are
published at 13:00 D-1. Intra-day trading opens at
11:45 D-1 and closes an hour before delivery. Bal-
ancing market timeline overlaps with the intra-day
and set the imbalance price for actions taken by the
TSO. SEM, on the other hand was a cost-based
market that included a market schedule dispatch D-1
which set the market price. This was followed by a
second dispatch schedule which accounted for
system constraints and system services.
Table 1
Summary of the main changes in the new market design that are addressed in this paper.
Component Description
Energy Market Trading Platform Transformation Liquidity in the forwards market and continuous intra-day trading platform is expected. Ex-ante market prices will be
published before delivery of power instead of the ex-post pricing used in SEM.
Cost Recovery No uplift mechanism or make whole payments to ensure full cost recovery in I-SEM. Introduces risk exposure for market
participants and a competitive edge into the market.
Capacity Market Reliability Options Auction-based financial call options, akin a one-way contract for difference, provides suppliers with a full hedge against
market prices. Incentivises reliable capacity.
Administrative Scarcity Pricing Incentivises flexible capacity to generate when a scarcity event using high prices.
System Services System Service Products Increasing from seven to fourteen products. Provide greater operational control when a frequency or voltage event occurs.
14 Tempus Energy Technology Limited, a UK-based demand response service
provider, took a legal case against General Court of Justice of the EU related to
the decision to afford certain market participants (generation units) contract
lengths up to 15 years but not demand side response technologies as being
anticompetitive, and therefore against EU State Aid guidelines. For more in-
formation on the case, see: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.
jsf?text=&docid=207792&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&
occ=first&part=1&cid=1430154.
15 Available from SEM's annual market revenues available at http://www.
sem-o.com/Pages/default.aspx or the PSO levy annual reports available at:
http://www.cer.ie/.
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mechanisms within this category, have inherent advantages and dis-
advantages. Di Cosmo and Lynch [24] draw attention to a significant
strength of the CPM related to the determination of the capacity pot size
and its independence from any possibility of market power exertion.
Since market liberalisation in 2000 mitigating against market power in
a market described by Walsh et al. as “an oligopolistic market with a
competitive fringe” [ [40], p.4] has been a high priority. On the other
hand, market-wide price-based capacity payment mechanisms risk
over-compensating capacity providers as they rely primarily on ad-
ministrative price setting and lack a competitive edge to reduce the
level of remuneration received. Moreover, when a financial instrument,
or specifically in the case of the CPM ‘a contract for physical avail-
ability’, rewards all market participants on an equal basis, it contains an
innate flaw – it distorts market exit signals for old, inefficient capacity.
3.2. The capacity remuneration mechanism
Ireland's capacity payment mechanism has been redesigned and
implemented alongside I-SEM to “help deliver secure supplies for con-
sumers in the all-island market, particularly with increasing variable gen-
eration” according to Single Electricity Market Committee [19]. The
Capacity Remuneration Mechanism (CRM), as it is known, is based on
volume-based reliability options (ROs) mechanism, operating in a si-
milar fashion to a financial call option or one-way contract for differ-
ence. The quantity of each RO is set centrally and allocated through a
competitive auction. The RO length can differ depending on levels of
investment made by the RO holder, ranging from 1 to 10-year contracts.
Successful RO holders, who must have the physical capacity to back-up
an option, will receive an annual payment. In exchange, RO holders
must refund the difference between the market reference price16 and a
pre-determined strike price17 to suppliers via the TSO if the strike price
is breached, as illustrated in Fig. 2. Suppliers initially fund the ROs
through a capacity charge levied as a fixed price per MWh of con-
sumption during a pre-defined set of hours [41]. This type of me-
chanism allows suppliers a full hedge against market prices above the
RO strike price. The principles behind reliability options are discussed
in detail by Vazquez [42] and Agency for the Cooperation of Energy
Regulators [31], while specific details associated with the mechanisms'
introduction in Ireland can be found in Single Electricity Market
Committee [41], Single Electricity Market Committee [43], Single
Electricity Market Committee [44].
3.2.1. Market participant eligibility
The Single Electricity Market Committee [41] stated that all capa-
city providers in I-SEM, including those receiving support, are eligible
to partake in the CRM once qualification requirements outlined in the
Capacity Market Code [45] are adhered to. All capacity entering auc-
tions must also apply a de-rating factor to their installed capacity that
has been calculated for each specific technology type and account for
the impact of plant size [46]. De-rating factors are based on historical
performance data and under certain circumstances allow evidence for
expected changes in future performance to be taken account of. Dis-
patchable capacity must enter the auctions while non-dispatchable ca-
pacity, once qualified to participate, can choose [41]. In each of the
categories, de-rating factors provide reliable capacity with an ad-
vantage as higher de-ratings are associated with higher reliability,
meaning a larger share of a unit's installed capacity can enter the CRM
auctions.
For variable capacity where outage patterns are highly correlated,
such as solar or wind power, de-rating factors are calculated based on
the entire class instead of individual units. The authorities decided to
include capacity receiving support to maximise competition in the CRM
auctions and to remain compliant with European Commission guide-
lines on State Aid guidelines for environmental protection and energy
which requires preference be given to capacity with lower carbon in-
tensities in a situation where capacities are of equal technical and
economic circumstances [37]. While the de-rating factors may be low
for variable capacity such as wind power, in Ireland's situation with a
large share of installed wind power relative to the system size, the
authorities expect wind power to substantially add to the competitive
auction.
3.2.2. Administrative scarcity pricing
The CRM also includes administrative scarcity pricing in the I-SEM
balancing market to provide a floor price when available capacity is
lower than expected demand (plus the associated reserve require-
ments). It is expected that introducing scarcity pricing will increase
system security through strong incentives, encourage economic effi-
ciency, provide entry and exit signals, promote demand response and
finally align with the approach taken in the British market for con-
sistent price signals when margins are tight [41]. It is also hoped that
implementing this type of pricing will address an aspect of SEM that has
been a concern for the RAs surrounding instances where scarcity events
have occurred but were not successfully conveyed in the system mar-
ginal price; an issue also experienced in the French and Great Britain
(GB) electricity markets in recent times.18 These situations may have
transpired for several reasons, for example; due to the risk adverse
nature of SEM, generators might not have the awareness of such events
or even the ability to adapt the output of their unit over a short time-
frame. Through the overall restructuring of Ireland's electricity market,
it is anticipated that market participants will play a more influential
role in the future (due to new level of financial and dispatch risk ex-
posure) and, therefore, may be better positioned to react to scarcity
events. In addition, the balancing market price ceiling will increase to
€10000/MWh while the day ahead market cap increases from €1000 to
€3000/MWh as the RAs implement the day-ahead price cap used in the
majority of TM compliance markets19 [18,44].
The Single Electricity Market Committee [41] expect scarcity pri-
cing to incentivise new, flexible and reliable peaking generation units
entering the market using the potential for high market prices at times
of system stress and therefore high revenues for those in operation, as a
lure. For old unreliable thermal capacity, scarcity pricing (and the re-
liability option approach in general) make capacity payments a riskier
revenue stream for the reasons previously alluded to and also shown in
Fig. 2 where the strike price must be repaid for the volume in receipt of
reliability option payment whether generating or not.
Under the new market arrangements, scarcity pricing applies when
a point has been reached where available capacity is insufficient to
meet demand, as illustrated in Fig. 3. The scarcity price will start from
the reliability option strike price and increase using a simple piece-wise
linear function until demand is met using the operating reserve capacity
or a ‘lost load’ event occurs20 [41].
16 The price obtained by the RO holder in selling their power in either the
day-ahead, intraday or the balancing markets [41].
17 The Single Electricity Market Committee [41] propose that a hypothetical
low-efficiency peaking unit using a floating strike price indexed to spot oil or
gas prices will set the strike price.
18 Further details available from Single Electricity Market Committee [41,
p.49].
19 The Iberian day-ahead electricity market maintained its existing price
range (€0–€180.30) after entering the European internal market [47].
20 Scarcity pricing along with other details of the CRM operational arrange-
ments will be “captured in and governed through, an updated Trading and
Settlement Code” which market participants must comply to according to Single
Electricity Market Committee [41, p.6].
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3.2.3. Effects of the CRM
The CRM may benefit dispatchable generators over their variable
counterparts. Under SEM arrangements, capacity payments were re-
warded to all generators based on their availability to generate. Under
the CRM, a generator must first bid for the RO, and if successful, must
be available to generate when margins are tight otherwise face re-
funding the entire market reference price for the RO volume.
Considering this, it is difficult to see the advantage for variable gen-
erators who receive out-of-market support payments bidding into CRM
auctions when traditionally capacity payments were not mutually ex-
clusive. On the other hand, if the generators in question do bid into the
CRM and the cost to refund the difference between the market and
strike prices can be passed onto the consumer, why would not they
enter?21 Therefore, all else being equal, the overall cost of renewable
energy support levied onto consumers through the Public Service Ob-
ligation charge–a charge introduced to ensure security of supply and
support indigenous and renewable fuel sources–may experience upward
pressure directly as a result of Ireland's new capacity mechanism being
implemented – a perspective shared by Di Cosmo and Lynch [24].
From a broader market perspective, changing capacity payments in
Ireland to an RO style mechanism will address the previously
Fig. 2. Reliability option difference payments [20].
Fig. 3. Parameterised administrative scarcity price function.
Source: Capacity Remuneration Mechanism Detailed Design Decision Paper 2, SEM-16-022, Dublin [43].
21 Wind power would be a prime example of a variable energy source that
may be affected by this type of capacity mechanism. It remains unclear as to
whether capacity receiving out-of-market support payments can pass the cost of
refunding a called RO payment can be passed onto consumers via the REFiT
scheme.
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mentioned concerns over ‘pot’ type approach regarding distorted exit
and entry signals and possible over-compensation. Other benefits of
pre-defined volume-based capacity auctions include the promotion of
competition – providing the best value for consumers through a com-
petitive edge, and the non-dilution of revenues when new capacity is
commissioned as occurs to-date [43].
4. Restructuring system services
Managing the all-island electricity system is a challenging task for
the TSO due to the nature of the system with low levels of storage and
interconnection, and yet one of the highest penetration levels of vari-
able renewable energy in Europe. Consequently, the system operator
heavily depends on reserve capacity in the form of ancillary service
products as a means of ensuring system stability if the delicately ba-
lanced supply and demand relationship falters. Furthermore, with fu-
ture generation portfolios expected to include increased levels of vari-
able energy sources, this enhances the technical challenges for the
system operators in terms of maintaining sufficient system inertia to
preserve system stability, along with the more commonly known con-
cerns around frequency and voltage response. The scale of the challenge
faced by the Irish TSO was analysed in a suite of studies called the
“Facilitation of Renewables” report [48]. The findings were further
refined in the “Ensuring a Secure, Reliable and Efficient Power System
in a Changing Environment” report which outlined the redesign and
overall strengthening of ancillary services necessary to facilitate a sig-
nificant rise in the level of variable generation capacity proposed for the
island of Ireland [49]. The learnings from these studies are important
for regions with ambition for high levels of variable renewable gen-
eration and are expanded on in Section 4.2 after a comparison of global
systems which display similarities to that of the all-island system are
discussed in Section 4.1.
4.1. Comparable system conditions
Compared to other systems worldwide, the goal of the DS3 pro-
gramme regarding the facilitation of 75% instantaneous non-synchro-
nous generation appears unprecedented on an island system with low
levels of asynchronous interconnection and little energy storage.
Electricity systems in New Zealand, Tasmania, and Singapore for ex-
ample all have certain similarities to that of Ireland in terms of market
or geographical scale. They also have either limited or no inter-
connection to neighbouring systems. However, none of the aforemen-
tioned have comparable levels of variable generation in their portfolios
and even if this was the case, all three contain ideal technologies to
accompany/facilitate variable generation with hydro-dominant port-
folios in New Zealand and Tasmania and an almost exclusively gas-fired
portfolio in Singapore [50]. For instance: New Zealand is completely
electrically isolated, yet has a hydro-dominant generation mix that re-
presented 55% of generation in 2015, providing vast amounts of flex-
ible storage [51]; Tasmania has the equivalent of 16 months’ worth of
hydro storage capacity according to a publication by KEMA [52],
making it rather unique; while Singapore generated 95% of electricity
from gas in 2016 [50]. Other systems such as that of the Iberian Pe-
ninsula (Spain and Portugal) and Denmark with high levels of variable
generation akin to Ireland, rely heavily on hydro in the former and
interconnection in the latter to facilitate variable generation. In Spain
for example, approximately 20% of generation capacity is hydro-based
while Denmark has nearly six times the interconnection capacity to that
of the all-island system yet is of a similar size [53].
Notwithstanding the fact of having a much greater system size,
more diversified generation mix and higher levels of interconnection,
some level of comparison can be drawn to the GB electricity system in
terms of frequency and voltage management, along with balancing and
flexibility issues recently outlined in a National Grid [54] publication.
In recent years, the GB system has started witnessing the impacts
associated with high levels of variable generation as balancing services
are being utilised to a greater extent as capacity increases according to
National Grid [54]. Consequently, reviews have been (or soon to be)
carried out relating to numerous aspects of the overall approach to
providing system services, such as; RoCoF requirements, frequency re-
sponse, active network management, regional network voltage protec-
tion systems [54]. Other studies, such as a recent report from the
SmartNet,22 that compare ancillary services from Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway and Spain only further exemplify the
unique conditions that the all-island system deals with on a daily basis
[55]. While some of the previously mentioned systems have similarities
to the all-island system, none endure the same rigor in terms of facil-
itating high variable generation with no synchronous interconnection
capacity, low levels of asynchronous interconnection and little storage.
Therefore, the learnings from this paper and particularly from the DS3
programme may be important for systems with ambition for high levels
of variable renewable generation.
4.2. The DS3 programme
The “DS3 - Delivering a Secure, Sustainable Electricity System”
programme was launched by the TSOs in 2011 to facilitate increased
levels of variable renewables on the island of Ireland. An overview of
the programme is shown in Fig. 4, identifying the three key pillars on
which the programme is constructed; System Policies, System Perfor-
mance, and System Tools. The figure also outlines the work streams
contained in each pillar.
Strengthening the existing ancillary service products while doubling
their number to fourteen is a significant feat. To facilitate this trans-
formation, the DS3 programme included the system tools and system
policies pillars as key contributors to the overall system service ar-
rangements. System tools provide control over the programme through
the various means outlined in Fig. 4 and the system policies pillar en-
sures the correct level of regulation is in place to support the success of
DS3 through policy control. While remaining cognisant that both pillars
are integral to the success of the programme, this section will con-
centrate on the system performance pillar and the technical aspects of
the DS3 programme that may provide a financial opportunity for
market participants to increase auxiliary revenue streams, thereby en-
couraging flexibility in the system – a characteristic which is considered
essential in a system with high levels of variable generation capacity
[2].
4.3. System performance
System performance relates to monitoring and managing the per-
formance of all units connected to the all-island electricity system.
Maintaining the performance level necessary to reach renewable elec-
tricity targets is important for both jurisdictions. Many changes are
ongoing in this category such as Grid Code modifications,23 developing
new practices in performance monitoring and increasing the level of
participation from demand side management participants. From a
technical perspective, there are two critical aspects of system operation
that must change for the successful adoption of the DS3 programme
[56]. First, the Rate of Change of Frequency (RoCoF) standard that a
thermal unit must ‘ride-through’ without disconnecting from the grid
and second, the restructuring of system service products in the all-is-
land electricity system.
22 The SmartNet project is funded through the European Union's Horizon
2020 research and innovation programme. For more information see: http://
smartnet-project.eu/.
23 Grid code is a set of standards for all plant to adhere to that are connected
to the system. For more details, see: http://www.eirgridgroup.com/.
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4.3.1. Rate of change of frequency
The RoCoF standard will increase from the current 0.5 Hz per
second to 1 Hz per second measured over 500 ms for all conventional
plants to comply with Grid Code [57]. For synchronous generation
capacity, this means their plant must stay synchronised with the system
through a change of frequency of up to 1 Hz per second measured over
500 ms. Increasing the RoCoF standard is not unheard of as both Spain
and Denmark, two fellow Member States with significant levels of
variable renewable energy, have implemented 2 Hz/s and 2.5 Hz/s
RoCoF standards respectively [58,59]. However, a significant difference
between what Ireland aims to do compared to Denmark or Spain, is
enforce the updated RoCoF standard on all existing thermal units, not
just newly commissioned plants.24
In changing the RoCoF standard, the TSO anticipate that higher
instantaneous penetration levels of variable renewable energy can be
facilitated in the system [48]. The parameter used by the TSOs to
measure the instantaneous penetration of variable renewable genera-
tion is called the System Non-Synchronous Penetration (SNSP) limit.
SNSP limit is calculated based on the volume of non-synchronous en-
ergy source generated plus interconnector imports as a percentage of
the overall demand plus interconnector exports. In Q2 2019, at the time
of writing, the SNSP limit is 65% non-synchronous energy sources [61].
By introducing the updated RoCoF standard along with the other DS3
work streams, this limit is anticipated to reach 75% – reducing cur-
tailment of renewable energy and therefore, helping to achieve binding
EU Member State renewable energy targets. Fig. 5 illustrates the SNSP
limits anticipated by the TSO over the period 2015–2020. The figure
also shows the benefit of introducing the various new/updated stan-
dards and work streams on the system in terms facilitating non-syn-
chronous generation.
4.3.2. System services
Maintaining a stable electricity system with as little as 580 MW25 of
asynchronous interconnection and less than 300 MW of pumped hydro
energy storage is a difficult feat, especially if one considers that in 2020,
the installed capacity of variable generation (i.e. wind and solar PV) is
expected to be 5600 MW [10]. For comparative purposes, the peak
system demand in the same year is expected to be approximately
7000 MW according to the median demand forecast for the all-island
electricity system [10]. Where other systems across Europe are not as
geographically isolated, interconnection with neighbouring systems is a
means of increasing security of supply and thus requiring fewer system
services. Similarly, EU Member States such as Spain, Germany, France,
Italy, and Austria have large pumped hydro energy storage capacity
which is ideal for storing energy when wholesale electricity prices are
low, for providing system services and for facilitating variable genera-
tion [63]. Recognising that no new interconnection or storage capacity
is expected in Ireland before 2025 when a proposed 700 MW inter-
connector to France may come online [64], system services remain
critical for system stability.
Once the system services work stream of the DS3 programme is fully
implemented in 2019, the number of system service products will in-
crease from seven under the current arrangement to fourteen to create
one of the most complex system service arrangements used in an
electricity system worldwide. In October 2016, eleven of the fourteen
system services became operational using regulated tariffs and volumes
set by the TSOs. The three products not yet in operation are fast fre-
quency response, dynamic reactive response, and fast post-fault active
power recovery. Details of new and existing system service products are
outlined in Section A of Table 2 while Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 show which of
the products relate to frequency control or voltage control. The figures
also allude to the ‘activation order’ timeline of products in the event of
an incident.
Figs. 6 and 7 demonstrate how the new system services complement
the existing products in order to improve system frequency and system
voltage control respectively. Each figure shows that additional products
have been introduced between the time an incident occurs and when
Fig. 4. DS3 programme structure.
Source: DS3 System Services Procurement Design and Emerging Thinking Decision Paper, SEM-14-108. Dublin [56].
24 This aspect of RoCoF created unrest between market participants in SEM
and the authorities, i.e. the TSOs and RAs, leading to an open consultation
followed by a recommendations paper on a remuneration mechanism to con-
tribute towards costs associated with the generation studies necessary to as-
certain whether a unit can meet the new RoCoF standard, for more information
see: [60].
25 The long-term view assumed by the TSOs regarding the Moyle asynchro-
nous interconnector is that it may have an 80 MW export limit due to network
constraints in GB [10].
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the existing products activate which allows greater operational control
over the system, in turn increasing the system's ability to facilitate
variable generation. For example, SIR and FFR provide an inertial and
fast-acting MW response from 0 to 5 s of a frequency event occurring.
Similarly, dynamic reactive response is important for system stability
when there are high levels of variable generation online to deliver a
reactive current response for voltage dips in the period before the ex-
isting steady-state reactive power product becomes active. Fast post-
fault active power recovery (FPRAPR) is the only new product not re-
presented on either Fig. 6 or Fig. 7. The FPRAPR product provides a
Fig. 5. Operational capability outlook.
Source: DS3 Programme Operational Capability Outlook 2016, EirGrid [62].
Table 2
Summary of DS3 system services products.
Sources: Section A: DS3 System Services Technical Definitions Decision Paper, SEM-13-098. Dublin [65]. Section B: DS3 System Services Tariffs and Scalars, Dublin
[66].
Section A Section B
Service Name Abbreviation Unit of Payment New or
Existing
Short Description Tariff Rates (€)
Synchronous Inertial Response SIR MWs2h New (Stored kinetic energy) * (SIR Factor - 15) 0.0050
Fast Frequency Response FFR MWh New MW delivered between 2 and 10 s 2.16
Primary Operating Reserve POR MWh Existing MW delivered between 5 and 15 s 3.24
Secondary Operating Reserve SOR MWh Existing MW delivered between 15 and 90 s 1.96
Tertiary Operating Reserve 1 TOR1 MWh Existing MW delivered between 90 s and 5 min 1.55
Tertiary Operating Reserve 2 TOR2 MWh Existing MW delivered between 5 min and 20 min 1.24
Replacement Reserve (De-
Synchronised)
RRD MWh Existing MW delivered between 20 min and 1 h 0.56
Replacement Reserve (Synchronised) RRS MWh Existing MW delivered between 20 min and 1 h 0.25
Ramping Margin 1 Hour RM1 MWh New The increased MW output that can be delivered with a good degree
of certainty for the given time horizon.
0.12
Ramping Margin 3 Hour RM3 MWh New 0.18
Ramping Margin 8 Hour RM8 MWh New 0.16
Fast Post-Fault Active Power Recovery FPFAPR MWh New Active power > 90% within 250 ms of voltage > 90% 0.15
Steady-state Reactive Power SRP MVArh Existing MVAr capability * (% of capacity that capability is provided) 0.23
Dynamic Reactive Response DRR MWh New MVAr capability during large (> 30%) voltage dips 0.04
Fig. 6. Frequency control services.
Source: DS3 System Services Technical Definitions Decision Paper, SEM-13-098. Dublin [65].
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positive contribution to system stability and security through its ability
to mitigate against the impact of large frequency disturbances through
fast power recovery response.27
Prospective providers of one or more system services outlined in
Table 2 are required to complete a qualification trial process to 1) assess
their technical ability to provide the product in question, 2) advise
authorities on the level of competition for each product, and 3) estab-
lish the current capabilities within the system [56]. The qualification
trials are carried out to assess the ability of a range of technologies to
provide the various products, as described by EirGrid & SONI [67]. All
technologies, including wind power, demand side, and other technol-
ogies such as battery storage, solar PV, flywheels, etc., along with
conventional generation are admissible to the trials. Once qualified,
prospective providers must enter successful bids for each system service
at product auctions to become a provider. Contracts for each product
will be awarded on an annual basis except in the case where investment
is necessary to provide a service where on a case-by-case basis contracts
of up to 20 years may be bestowed on the participant28 [56]. The vo-
lume of each product described in Table 2 will be determined annually
by the TSO [68].
In the event of low market participation or where the possibility for
market power exertion exists, the contract price may be defined via a
TSO set regulated tariff. The authorities suggest that applying regulated
tariffs will not be the enduring solution in I-SEM, instead expect a
competitive process to be in place in the long-term. Regulated tariffs
will be calculated using a “cost-plus” approach which incorporates the
previously defined Best New Entrant approach and a regulated rate of
return aspect as described by EirGrid & SONI [69]. Bearing in mind the
need to send the correct investment signals to market participants, the
authorities will set all regulated tariffs for a period of five years once
the system services are fully implemented [56]. In a move that is in-
tended to provide greater certainty for the industry, the authorities
stated that “[Regulated tariffs may] provide guidance on the prices that may
result from the competitive process.” [56, p.35].
Section B of Table 2 outlines the regulated tariffs for the operational
DS3 system services along with the products yet to be implemented, i.e.
fast frequency response, dynamic reactive response, and fast post-fault
active power recovery. These tariffs allow an insight into the potential
revenue to be earned by generators for providing system services. The
price received by market participants for providing system service
products is also subject to scalars in an attempt to increase performance
of the procurement design by rewarding providers who ‘turn up’ in
times of most need. The scalars are based on performance, scarcity,
product and volume [56].
4.4. Revenues from DS3 programme related activities
While the updated RoCoF standard will be a requirement for
thermal units under Grid Code, there is no direct revenue to be earned
from having the ability to “ride-through” a frequency event. Indirectly,
however, achieving the standard may ensure that a unit has a higher
number of operational hours over a unit still to comply with the stan-
dard change for system stability reasons. System services on the other
hand, do provide a direct revenue stream as shown in Section B of
Table 2. Through the DS3 programme and its associated 75% SNSP
target, the TSO estimated the annual benefit of reducing variable re-
newable energy curtailment to be in the range of €177 million by 2020
– in other words, the TSO expects the overall energy market costs to
reduce by that amount [56]. When taken along with the existing ex-
penditure cap on ancillary services (€60 million), the total is rounded to
€235 million and used as the annual ‘cap’ for system services from 2020
onwards [56]. From a high-level view, Fig. 8 illustrates the anticipated
redistribution of revenue streams estimated the RAs in the “DS3 System
Services Procurement Design and Emerging Thinking” publication [56].
4.4.1. Redistribution of revenue streams
Participants in Ireland's electricity market have already witnessed a
change in their revenue streams over the past number of years and this
trend is expected to continue through the transition to I-SEM and be-
yond while policy measures influence the generation portfolio. Between
2007 and 2016 for example, the total annual energy payments in SEM
decreased by 49% (€2.7 to €1.37 billion)29 while other payments, such
as capacity payments, remained relatively constant [74]. The RAs have
shown awareness of the changing marketplace through their central
involvement in the restructuring process to facilitate future generation
portfolios in the new design for the island of Ireland. Notwithstanding
Fig. 7. Voltage control services26.
Source: DS3 System Services Technical Definitions Decision Paper, SEM-13-098. Dublin [65].
26 Network adequacy and Grid 25 - another TSO-led programme based on
improving transmission infrastructure - are included in the figure to illustrate
the important part the transmission network has in neutralising a fault.
27 For further details on the technical characteristics of FPFAPR and the other
products, see Ref. [65].
28 A potential conflict of interest was raised by market participants relating to
the TSOs' ownership of a 500 MW interconnector to Great Britain that can
provide system services. The SEM committee found that as the interconnector
was financed by the Irish energy consumer, it should therefore be used in a
means that maximises the value to the consumer. Therefore, the interconnector
will not participate directly in any auctions and will be treated as a price taker
for its volume. Effectively the volumes to be auctioned will be net of the pro-
vision the interconnector can provide [56].
29 The 2016 annual energy market revenue is 32% below the nine-year
average. It is recognised that fuel and emission costs have a part in this re-
duction; however, the effect of high levels of zero-marginal cost generation on
lowering system marginal prices has been shown in numerous articles such as
[70–73]. For more information on the annual market revenues, see [74].
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the fact that revenue streams are naturally rebalancing as generation
portfolios evolve, the transformation under I-SEM (including the ca-
pacity and system service elements) takes a significant step to what
future electricity market designs may look like worldwide – optimally
balancing efficiency, flexibility and system adequacy.
As demonstrated in Fig. 8, I-SEM consists of three primary revenue
streams for market participants. With future energy payments expected
to reduce because of large volumes of zero-marginal-cost variable re-
newable energy being installed to meet renewable targets, thermal
generators operating purely on the energy market may not receive
sufficient inframarginal rent to service debts related to fixed costs, i.e.
the missing money problem. Furthermore, as outlined by Deane et al.
[2], many of these generators are vital for the long-term operation of
the system, in terms of meeting system adequacy requirements, pro-
viding flexible generation, inertia requirements, voltage and frequency
response. To address this concern, I-SEM is more value-based than its
predecessor – rewarding generators that add flexibility and reliability to
the system. Through the DS3 programme for example, flexible units
benefit from the increased number of system service products that can
be availed of, along with scalars based on performance, scarcity, pro-
duct and volume. In the CRM both reliability and flexibility are re-
warded as the former is a key characteristic of any such financial op-
tion-based mechanism and the latter, an advantageous characteristic
when administrative scarcity pricing is in place.
5. Conclusion
Climate mitigation policies are influencing generation portfolios.
With technological change comes both, sectoral and market change.
Pecuniary externalities such as support mechanisms and carbon taxes,
introduced via policy measures, can distort market price formation and
affect system operations. Through this case study, the other side of the
coin is observed. The paper explores the strategy used by an isolated
system with high levels of variable renewable generation to optimise
the balance between efficiency, flexibility and system adequacy while
maintaining a fully functional system that strives to adapt to the evol-
ving conditions.
This case study highlights several concerns that are soon to be or are
already, relevant to a wide range of electricity markets. Technical issues
relating to frequency and voltage control, market issues around de-
creasing system marginal prices – leading to the ‘missing money’ pro-
blem, and institutional issues concerning Ireland's need to become
compatible with the greater European internal electricity market, all
offer an insight into both internal and external policy influences that
manifested themselves in the 2018 market transformation. This paper
also demonstrates the length at which Ireland will go to achieve am-
bitious energy-related policy decisions to curtail the effects of climate
change.
Implementing the energy market changes alluded to in Section 2
instils a competitive edge that entices market participants to play a
more influential/central role in the future marketplace while at-
tempting to reduce financial risk exposure. Withdrawing the reassur-
ance of fully cost recovery creates a situation where the “training
wheels” have been removed and competition can prosper. Redesigning
the capacity mechanism also fosters competition through the auc-
tioning of reliability options. The in-coming mechanism addresses
concerns surrounding distorted entry and exit signals, over-compensa-
tion, and the dilution of revenues associated with new capacity being
commissioned, through a pre-defined volume-based capacity auction
that promotes flexible and reliable capacity, as discussed in Section 3.
Restructuring system services increases the operational ability to con-
trol frequency and voltage during an event through additional system
service products, a new RoCoF standard and a range of other inputs
from the DS3 programme, as described in Section 4. In short; re-
structuring system services aims to increase operational control of the
system which equates to heightened system stability, thereby im-
proving the system's capacity to facilitate higher levels of variable
generation. The actions, when taken together, provide an insight into
the lengths to which this electricity market must go, to transform from
its cost-based nature to a value-based alternative that rewards flexible
and reliable capacity with the ability to evolve with market conditions
of the future.
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